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AIG Edition 3
- AIG Team
- May 9
- 12 min read
Summary: The U.S. and Ukraine finalized the minerals deal, giving the U.S. access to critical resources like graphite and titanium, key materials for building military aircraft such as F-35s and F-15s. The agreement comes as the U.S. faces a decline in fighter jet production and a more vulnerable Indo-Pacific defense posture after shifting many of its regional military assets to the Middle East. As China steps up military pressure near Taiwan, the U.S. will likely aim to boost defense manufacturing through the deal, strengthening security in the Indo-Pacific.
Development: On 8 May, the U.S. and Ukraine ratified a minerals deal granting the U.S. access to minerals and rare earth minerals such as graphite and titanium. The partnership aims to provide Ukraine with military support and opportunities for economic development and infrastructure enhancement while increasing U.S. supply chains with the newly accessible resources found in Ukraine. In 2024, the U.S. defense industry delivered approximately 157 fighter jets, most notably the F-35 and F-16. The 2024 production numbers mark a decrease from previous years and a downward trend in fighter jet production. Graphite and titanium are vital minerals required in the manufacturing of defense aircraft. The U.S. has recently restructured significant amounts of its military capabilities from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East in response to escalating regional threats from Iran. In recent months, China has escalated its military activities around Taiwan. In April 2025, China conducted military drills off Taiwan's coasts, warning against Taiwan's independence and as punishment for perceived provocations.
Analysis: The minerals deal between Ukraine and the U.S. is likely to increase aerial defense sector manufacturing to support military efforts in the Indo-Pacific assets and stabilize rising global threats against the U.S. This action by the U.S. likely increased the vulnerability of its Indo-Pacific posture against China, especially in deterring China and maintaining regional influence in the region. The U.S. gains access to crucial minerals through the deal, likely allowing it to manufacture the defense assets it sent to the Middle East. As the Indo-Pacific remains vulnerable, the U.S. will likely increase manufacturing in the air defense sector to prevent Chinese escalation on Taiwanese sovereignty.
[Jordy Torres]
Summary: Moscow declared a three-day ceasefire with Kyiv, while the U.S. and European Union (EU) are pushing for an extended 30-day ceasefire. If Moscow rejects the extension, the U.S. and EU will impose harsh sanctions jointly. Moscow will likely accept the extended ceasefire to avoid further economic deterioration and destabilization.
Development: On May 8, a ceasefire deal between Russia and Ukraine took effect, set to last three days. Moscow set the ceasefire ahead of Russia’s Victory Day celebrations, the 80th anniversary of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany in World War II. The U.S. and the EU are coordinating a diplomatic effort to extend the ceasefire to 30 days. Due to the current ceasefire, humanitarian aid has reached affected regions in eastern Ukraine. Washington and the EU have warned Moscow that failure to accept the 30-day ceasefire agreement will lead to coordinated sanctions on Russian infrastructure. Russia’s economy is experiencing a 10.3% inflation rate year-over-year, along with the strain of military production spending. U.S. President Donald Trump said the U.S. and its allies will impose further sanctions on Russia if it does not agree to the proposed 30-day ceasefire agreement.
Analysis: The proposed 30-day ceasefire by the U.S. and EU will likely establish the foundation and reinforce a potential shift from short-term pauses to a strategic negotiation to end the war. The high volume of war production efforts and an increased inflation rate will likely put pressure on Moscow to accept the extended ceasefire due to the threat of further sanctions from the U.S. and EU. An extended ceasefire will likely allow Moscow to regroup and alleviate its military without any international escalation. The increase in humanitarian aid to eastern Ukraine will likely boost global visibility on the impact in eastern Ukraine, putting more international pressure on Moscow to accept the extended ceasefire agreement. The 30-day ceasefire proposal is likely a diplomatic move by Washington and the EU to lay the necessary groundwork for more structured negotiations, possibly signaling a push toward conflict resolution with Moscow.
[Jacob Faciana]
Summary: The U.S. and Ukraine recently ratified a minerals deal allowing the U.S. access to critical minerals, such as graphite, in return for military assistance to Ukraine. The deal will likely weaken China's global critical minerals market dominance and reduce U.S. dependence on Chinese graphite.
Development: On 8 May, the Ukrainian Parliament ratified a strategic minerals deal that gives the U.S. access to Ukraine's reserves of critical materials, including graphite. The deal outlines frameworks for cooperation on mineral exploration, extraction, and processing. Ukraine is home to Europe's largest graphite reserves, vital to the U.S. defense sector. Ukraine has the fifth largest graphite reserves in the world but is only responsible for 0.5% of global production. The U.S. imports roughly 65% of its graphite from China. Beijing imposed restrictions on graphite exports in 2023. The U.S. and China remain in a trade conflict, including tariffs affecting strategic materials. Graphite is critical in U.S. defense applications, including tanks, submarines, and corvettes. Graphite is also a major component in electric vehicle production. The electric vehicle market in the U.S. provides 195,000 jobs.
Analysis: The minerals deal between the U.S. and Ukraine will likely reduce the U.S. reliance on graphite imports from China while securing a stable and long-term supply of critical essentials to U.S. defense and the electric vehicle industry. Beijing's 2023 graphite restrictions exposed U.S. vulnerabilities in import reliance, prompting a shift toward alternative sources and contributing to the minerals deal with Kyiv. Despite holding the world's fifth-largest graphite reserves, Ukraine accounts for just 0.5% of global output, highlighting its potential as a long-term alternative to Chinese graphite for the U.S. Washington is likely to increase investment and involvement in Ukraine's mineral industry along with its agreed-upon military support. U.S. companies will likely pursue joint ventures or public-private partnerships in Ukraine once the war with Russia ends. As the U.S. electric vehicle industry continues to grow, the minerals deal with Ukraine will likely strengthen both the domestic job market and the automotive sector.
[Unnamed Contributor]
Summary: Tehran has reportedly signaled to the Houthi rebels in Yemen to consider a ceasefire in attacks on U.S. assets. The ceasefire message did not extend to Israel. However, the Houthis are unlikely to escalate the situation with Israel during this period to avoid complicating Iran’s diplomatic positioning and keeping tensions with Washington at ease.
Development: On 7 May, Iranian officials urged the Houthis in Yemen to agree to a ceasefire on U.S. military assets in the region. The request came through diplomatic intermediaries in Oman and Qatar and aligns with Tehran’s effort to create a more favorable environment for restarting nuclear negotiations with the U.S. The ceasefire message did not include Israel, although the Houthis have issued public threats against the country. The U.S. stated that an unsuccessful nuclear negotiation could trigger military options against Iran and resume its operations against the Houthis.
Analysis: The Houthis are unlikely to escalate attacks on Israeli targets during the current negotiation period, despite their threats and Israel’s exclusion from Iran’s ceasefire message. A Houthi strike on Israel would likely prompt an Israeli response and potentially draw the U.S. into the conflict. The U.S. resuming military efforts against the Houthis would weaken nuclear negotiation efforts with Tehran and likely cause any progress to reverse. Tehran is seeking to stabilize the region to advance nuclear negotiations and avoid additional U.S. sanctions or military escalation. If the talks are unsuccessful, the U.S. has signaled the possibility of direct military action against Iranian assets, which could also lead to resumed and intensified strikes on the Houthis. Tehran and the Houthis have strong incentives to maintain regional peace while nuclear negotiations between Washington and Tehran remain active.
[Unnamed Contributor]
Summary: The United Arab Emirates lifted its travel ban on Lebanon and agreed to economic cooperation with Beirut, signaling a potential shift in Gulf policy toward re-engagement. Lebanon’s ongoing diplomatic outreach to Riyadh signals improving ties and could prompt a rebound in trade and military support if it successfully curtails Hezbollah’s influence.
Development: On 7 May, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) lifted its travel ban on its citizens to Lebanon. Previously, Abu Dhabi banned its citizens from traveling to Lebanon, and the UK had heavy travel advisories for its citizens. Abu Dhabi placed a travel ban on Lebanon in 2021 and withdrew its diplomats from Beirut. Along with lifting the travel ban, Beirut and Abu Dhabi agreed to collaborate on economic and institutional development. In 2024, Lebanon’s tourist arrivals dropped by 32%, and tourism accounts for 30% of its GDP compared to the global average of 3%. Saudi Arabia was Lebanon’s top destination for agricultural exports in 2019, accounting for 22% of the total. Riyadh halted over $3 billion in military aid to Lebanon in 2016 due to Hezbollah’s influence. In March 2025, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun visited Riyadh to discuss resuming imports and lifting the travel ban on Saudi Arabian citizens to Lebanon. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have reportedly seized 90% of Hezbollah’s infrastructure south of the Litani River.
Analysis: The lifting of travel bans to Lebanon by the UAE and UK will likely reignite Lebanon’s tourism industry and aid in economic rehabilitation. The lifted travel ban from the UAE and the recent discussion between Beirut and Riyadh indicate the warming of ties to Lebanon. Riyadh will likely follow suit with Abu Dhabi as the two states have done in the past and lift its travel ban on Lebanon. A shift in Riyadh’s policy towards Lebanon will likely lead to the resumption of Lebanese imports to Saudi Arabia and possibly, as a long-term goal, the reactivation of military aid to Lebanon. Riyadh will be wary of making any consequential moves regarding Lebanon, with Hezbollah still in the frame of significant influence. If Beirut and the LAF can meet certain demands regarding the disarmament of Hezbollah, Riyadh will likely resume trade and support for Beirut.
[Unnamed Contributor]
Summary: New Delhi carried out a cross-border missile strike in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, resulting in the deepest attack into Pakistan from India since 1971. In response, Beijing likely plans to increase its support for Pakistan in the Kashmir dispute, given the strategic trade importance of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
Development: On 7 May, New Delhi launched a cross-border missile strike in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, killing 31. The same day, Beijing issued a statement vowing to support Pakistan in the conflict in Kashmir. CPEC is a Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project that connects western China to the Gwadar Port on Pakistan’s coast through a series of regional projects. The CPEC route relies on Pakistani control over the Gilgit-Baltistan and Kashmir regions. 80% of Beijing’s oil imports pass through the Malacca Strait, the only trade route connecting the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean. CPEC aims to create a land route from China to the Indian Ocean. U.S. tariffs on China are still in effect and Beijing’s BRI efforts in certain countries are experiencing a reversal.
Analysis: Beijing is likely to increase its support for Pakistan in the Kashmir conflict due to the strategic significance of CPEC. CPEC’s alternative access to connect China with the Indian Ocean will likely alleviate China’s dependency on the Malacca Strait, which makes support for Pakistan in the Kashmir conflict critical. The combination of 80% of Chinese oil imports passing through the Malacca Strait and the potential for a military blockade will likely drive Beijing to great lengths to ensure CPEC’s stability for land access to the Indian Ocean. Beijing’s BRI efforts are pulling back because of the global trade climate with the U.S., which puts more strategic weight on the success of CPEC.
[Jackson Ochs]
Summary: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), China’s armed forces, entered Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), increasing the number of Chinese military assets crossing the Taiwan Strait median line to just over 100 so far this May. China’s increasing presence around Taiwan is likely to cause growing fears of conflict and mass intimidation.
Development: On 7 May, the Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan tracked five Chinese military aircraft, eight naval ships, and one official ship off the coast of Taiwan. One of the military aircraft entered Taiwan’s ADIZ. In this designated airspace, a country must file a flight plan, identify itself, and follow procedures in the interest of the host nation’s national security. In response, Taiwan launched aircraft and naval ships to investigate the PLA’s movement. It also positioned coastal-based missile systems, ready to use if needed. Since 2020, China has ramped up its military presence around the island in hopes of intimidating and weakening the people’s faith in a unified and separate Taiwan. China’s gray zone tactics, coercive operations short of war, have exponentially risen as they look to “achieve security without sizable use of force,” according to TaiwanNews. Cross-strait relations have deteriorated immensely since 2016, most recently in February, after a Chinese cargo ship was found liable and prosecuted for damaging subsea communication cables near a chain of Taiwanese-controlled islands in the strait. In March, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth visited the Indo-Pacific region and shared his strategy for deterrence. Alongside this, U.S. President Donald Trump plans an upcoming visit to the Middle East.
Analysis: Tensions continue to rise between Taiwan and China over the struggle for independence. The growing presence of the People’s Liberation Army off the coast of Taiwan will likely increase fears of a Chinese invasion. If China continues to enter Taiwan’s airspace or coastal waters, a larger response from the rest of the international community will likely follow. In particular, the unification conflict will likely draw in the U.S. as a third party and strategic actor. In the past few years, the U.S. has amplified its involvement in Taiwan affairs, serving as a mix of strategic, economic, ideological, and political interests. The U.S. continues to view Taiwan as a critical piece of its Indo-Pacific Strategy while balancing its priorities with the conflict in the Middle East. While the U.S. attempts to balance its deterrence strategies between both conflicts, China could likely intensify its aggressive pressures on Taiwan. Foreign actors continue formally recognizing Taipei’s statehood; however, no country has officially recognized it as sovereign, likely to keep tensions with Beijing at bay.
[Delaney Kingsland ]
Summary: Egypt hosted an 18-day joint military exercise with China. Given Egypt's access to advanced U.S. military equipment, China could gain valuable insights into U.S. military technologies, prompting Washington to take stronger diplomatic measures with Cairo to limit Beijing's access.
Development: On 1 May, Egypt and China conducted a joint military exercise in Egypt, focusing on air force exercises and military coordination. The U.S. provides Egypt with military aid and equips it with advanced military technologies, including fighter jets, tanks, and sophisticated defense systems. These U.S.-supplied capabilities provide Egypt with significant access to sensitive military information. The exercise is part of a broader effort by Egypt to diversify its defense relationships, with growing military cooperation between Cairo and Beijing. The exercise is part of Egypt's broader strategic shift to diversify its defense partnerships, in which China has become an increasingly important partner. Cairo and Beijing have strengthened their military relations over the past few years, providing China access to U.S. military technology and growing regional influence.
Analysis: The growing military cooperation between Egypt and China, particularly in light of Egypt's access to advanced U.S. military technology, poses a potential risk of China gaining material intelligence on U.S. military capabilities. The U.S. will likely take a more active role in managing its relationship with Egypt, using diplomatic channels to discourage further deepening military ties with China. Washington is expected to safeguard its sensitive military technologies and may reassess the terms of its military aid to Egypt if Chinese collaboration continues to grow. Washington could seek to reinforce its relationship with Cairo by offering more favorable terms of aid, military training, and defense cooperation, aiming to counterbalance the growing Chinese influence. Given Egypt's long-standing alliance with the U.S., Washington will likely use diplomatic channels to emphasize the importance of maintaining military ties with the U.S. while curbing closer engagement with China. Additionally, Washington could consider reducing or restructuring military aid to Egypt if Cairo continues to deepen its cooperation with Beijing.
[Unnamed Contributor]
Summary: Pro-Palestinian hacktivist groups involved in the Israel-Hamas cyber conflict are increasingly redirecting their efforts toward India following a recent terror attack in Kashmir. The groups are conducting cyberattacks against the Indian government, military, education, and infrastructure sectors, signaling a broader regional shift in hacktivist focus tied to geopolitical and religious tensions.
Development: On 25 April, Indian networks saw a significant surge in Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, with traffic volumes peaking at 256 Gbps and flood speeds reaching 204 Mbps. The terror attack in Pahalgam, Kashmir, on 22 April that killed 26 people sparked a noticeable uptick in cyber activity targeting India. DDoS traffic volume increased by 1,000% from 22 April to 25 April. The attacks aimed at government institutions, the military, the education sector, manufacturing, and other critical infrastructure. Among the 45 active hacktivist collectives tied to the India-Pakistan cyber conflict, seven are legacy groups from the Israel-Hamas cyber campaign who have aligned themselves with pro-Pakistan actors. These groups are adapting their identities. For example, "Team_insane_Pakistan" has been rebranded as "Team Insane PK" to participate in the India-Pakistan cyber domain. This shift coincides with the arrest of Telegram founder Pavel Durov in France on 24 August 2024. French authorities argued that Telegram's weak content moderation enabled illegal activities, including cybercrime. Telegram agreed to cooperate with law enforcement as part of a negotiated release deal, leading to bans on multiple hacktivist actors and increased intelligence sharing with EUROPOL. Cyberattacks increasingly involve web defacements exploiting deserialization vulnerabilities (e.g., CWE-502), often used to express religious hatred. Indian and Pakistani schools have been mutual targets of defacement attacks claimed by groups such as "Indian Cyber Mafia" and "Nation of Saviors."
Analysis: The escalation of cyberattacks tied to the India-Pakistan conflict suggests a growing convergence between Middle Eastern and South Asian hacktivist networks. Many legacy actors from the Israel-Hamas and Russia-Ukraine cyber conflicts are now engaging in India-related campaigns motivated by religious affiliations and regional alliances. Unlike Russia-Ukraine hacktivism, which often focuses on political or nationalistic motives, actors from the Middle East are likely driven by religious ideology. The involvement of legacy groups under rebranded aliases highlights a persistent threat, with many resurfacing despite earlier bans. The movement of legacy groups to the India-Pakistan conflict will likely lead to a surge of new groups. There is a high likelihood that Operational Technology (OT) systems could be targeted in the future, raising the stakes for Indian national security. The evolving nature of hacktivist group identities and the geopolitical motivations behind their actions point to a sustained and ideologically charged cyber threat landscape.
[Reyben Cortes]
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