AIG Edition 2

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MOROCCO: Sea Access for Sahel Likely to Challenge Algiers' Influence in the Region

Summary: Rabat recently offered Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso global trade access through its seaports on the Atlantic. The initiative will likely reshape West Africa's trade and political alignments while strengthening these countries' relationships with Rabat and impacting relations with Algeria.

Development: On 28 April, Rabat offered the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), which comprises Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, global trade access through its Atlantic ports. The AES is a defense pact and confederation between the Sahel states of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. The Sahel states were originally members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) but withdrew in 2023 after ECOWAS threatened military intervention to restore civilian rule. This threat came in response to a series of coups in the region, which resulted in military-led governments taking control of the Sahel states. ECOWAS receives backing from the U.S. and Europe, while the AES has expelled all U.S. and European security forces and cut off their support from the member states. AES has strengthened its ties with Algiers and Moscow. Morocco and Algeria are regional rivals, having severed all diplomatic ties due to their dispute over the sovereignty of Western Sahara. The Western Sahara provides Morocco with 690 miles of Atlantic coastline, on which Rabat is building a $1.2 billion seaport project. 

Analysis: The AES will likely accept Rabat’s offer of global trade access through its Atlantic ports to reduce dependency on Algerian markets and diversify its economy. Morocco’s trade access offer to the AES countries positions it as an alternative to ECOWAS’s Western-backed framework. This shift could undermine ECOWAS as the AES states increasingly turn to Morocco, a U.S. and European ally, for strategic and economic partnerships. Morocco challenges Algeria’s influence in the Sahel by strengthening ties with the AES, likely escalating political tensions between the two nations. The AES’s use of Moroccan seaports is likely to be an implicit recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara, which strains AES relations with Algeria.

[Jacob Faciana]

VENEZUELA: U.S. Oil License Expiration Likely to Force Government Change

Summary: Washington is likely to allow Venezuela's oil licenses to expire due to President Maduro’s failure to make progress on democratic reforms. Venezuela is likely to offset the impact by strengthening ties with markets such as Russia, China, and Iran.

Development: On 28 April, Venezuela experienced large queues of oil tankers at its ports. Washington's licenses permitting oil and gas transactions from Venezuela will expire on 27 May. The U.S. issued the licenses after agreeing with President Maduro to hold a fair and open election with his opposition parties. The non-renewal of the licenses came after President Maduro failed to meet the democratic reform demands during the election. Washington stated it would determine the renewal or creation of new licenses based on Venezuela's future steps to implement a democratic process. Venezuelan oil transactions under U.S. licenses have contributed 52% of Venezuelan exports. Venezuela has the world's largest oil and gas reserves but sits at number eight in global oil exports. 

Analysis: The expiration of U.S. licenses on Venezuelan oil transactions will likely lead Caracas to strengthen ties elsewhere. The U.S. licenses make up over half of Venezuela’s exports, making it economically critical for Caracas to shift its focus to alternative markets. Other nations such as China, Russia, and Iran have been supporters of Venezuela. However, they may find it difficult to sustain a Venezuelan shift due to the geopolitical and economic concessions they would experience from Washington in return. The potential isolation and economic downfall Venezuela may experience once the licenses expire will likely force Maduro’s government to concede to Washington’s demands for political reform and democratic process.

[Unnamed Contributor]

SYRIA: U.S. Framework to Lift Sanctions Likely to Test State Control

Summary: The interim government in Syria met with U.S. officials to discuss the framework in Syria to remove sanctions. The demands from Washington and Damascus’ preparedness to join the Abraham Accords will likely cause internal conflict within Syria, testing the interim government’s grip over Syria.

Development: On 25 April, the U.S. laid out the framework for lifting Syrian sanctions. The U.S. wants to see the interim government in Syria crack down on extremist groups and expel all foreign fighters from its borders. The interim government in Syria is looking to join the Abraham Accords, which is an agreement that would normalize relations with Israel. In March of 2025, Washington gave Damascus a demand to “publicly ban all Palestinian armed and political activities and deport members of these groups,” according to the Middle East Eye. Syrian authorities arrested senior leaders of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in Syria on 22 April. The PIJ has been an Israeli target in Syria that has brought on airstrike campaigns into Syria. 

Analysis: The recent framework laid out by Washington in order to lift sanctions on Syria will likely test Damascus’ state control. Damascus’s recent arrests of senior PIJ leaders suggest it is preparing to comply with U.S. demands to halt all Palestinian activity in Syria. However, such a move is likely to provoke internal conflict, as it risks stirring dissent within pro-Palestinian factions in Syria. If Damascus decides to join the Abraham Accords, factions throughout the country will likely oppose the decision, which may reveal the true grip the interim government has over Syria. This internal opposition may expose the limits of the regime’s control and its current hold on power, especially in regions where its influence is already weak. The path Damascus chooses may not only reshape its foreign policy but also reveal the deeper fault lines within its domestic governance.

[Unnamed Contributor]

CONGO: M23 Ceasefire Likely to Fail from Lack of Local Buy-In and External Pressure

Summary: Doha brokered a temporary ceasefire between Kinshasa and the M23 rebel group. The agreement is likely to collapse due to unresolved disputes and deep mistrust between the parties, as it is perceived as externally imposed and overlooks key points of contention.

Development: On 20 April, Doha successfully brokered a temporary ceasefire between Kinshasa and the M23 rebel group, which has been waging conflict in the country’s eastern region. This ceasefire marks the seventh attempt to de-escalate the conflict between the DR Congo armed forces and the M23 rebel group, with the last six ceasefire agreements having failed. Both sides have accused each other of violating terms, and the underlying grievances remain unaddressed. The Rwandan government supports M23, but Kingali still denies all accusations of providing physical support. A source from Kinshasa said that tensions had inflamed and stated: "Our justice system is independent. We cannot give in to every whim. Crimes have been committed. Some people must pay." The M23 group continues to demand greater political autonomy and protection for ethnic Tutsis in DR Congo. Kinshasa remains firm on territorial integrity and disarmament.

Analysis: The Qatar-brokered ceasefire between the DR Congo government and the M23 rebel group will likely collapse, following the pattern of six failed ceasefires. External actors in Doha created and mediated the agreement, likely undermining local buy-in. If there is little local buy-in, there will likely be a lack of enforcement measures, which could lead to hostilities continuing. With past successes and territorial gains, M23 is unlikely to compromise with Kinshasa and resume hostilities. Kingali's stance of denial likely indicates their continued support for M23 in the DR Congo. The lack of local buy-in with the assumed support from Kingali will likely lead to the ceasefire agreement failing, leading to a resumption of violence in Eastern DR Congo.

[Unnamed Contributor]