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AIG Edition 17
- AIG Team
- Oct 10
- 5 min read
Summary: Baku is calling for increased military cooperation between the Organization of Turkic States and to hold a joint military exercise under Azerbaijan's leadership. Baku is likely to pursue increased Turkic cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's support through aggressive posturing, which could lead to geopolitical tensions with Moscow and Tehran.
Development: On 9 October, Baku announced to the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) that it will be holding a joint military exercise under its leadership in 2026 to promote regional security amongst Turkic states and increase its presence on the global stage. The OTS consists of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, along with Hungary and Turkmenistan as observer states. Ankara recently brought together defense ministers from Azerbaijan and Georgia to sign agreements aimed at enhancing regional security through a partnership. Washington brokered a ceasefire and peace deal between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which led to the agreements and construction of the Zangezur Corridor, a proposed railway to connect Azerbaijan to its western enclave through southern Armenia. The Zangezur Corridor will directly connect Europe to the Caspian Sea, thereby increasing Europe's access to energy exports from the region. Russia's foreign focus and influence have shifted towards its efforts in Ukraine. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) have both taken strides to provide economic and military support to Azerbaijan and the wider Caucasus region through military support, infrastructure projects such as the Zangezur Corridor, and diplomacy.
Analysis: Baku is likely to increase its aggressive regional posture, specifically amongst OTS, to secure a more dominant and independent stance in the region, both militarily and economically. With the increase in support for the Zangezur Corridor from Washington and Ankara, Baku will likely utilize this support to assert itself as a dominant regional figure. Azerbaijan, having a shared Turkic identity with many other states, will likely lead to the implementation of pan-Turkic support, leading to distancing from Moscow. Many of the Turkic states in Central Asia rely heavily on Russia, but Baku will likely challenge this regional dominance through the Zangezur Corridor, connecting the Central Asian Turkic states into European trade via the Caspian Sea. Moscow will likely shift its focus back to the Caucasus and Central Asia once the war in Ukraine ends, which will more than likely lead to Russian efforts to bring the region back under its influence. Due to Moscow's shift in focus towards its war in Ukraine, Baku will likely increase the pace of its regional efforts, utilizing Moscow's current attention deficit in the Caucasus.
[Unnamed Contributor]
Summary: Israel and Hamas approved the first phase of a U.S.-proposed peace plan involving an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and mutual prisoner and hostage releases. The end of hostilities is expected to generate regional diplomatic and economic momentum, particularly encouraging renewed political engagement between Israel, Lebanon, and Syria.
Development: On 9 October, Israel and Hamas approved the first phase of a U.S.-proposed peace plan, which includes Israel withdrawing its forces to an agreed line in Gaza, the release of Palestinian prisoners and detainees, and the release of Israeli hostages. The deal states that Hamas is to release the Israeli hostages within 48 hours of the start of the agreement. The international community has mutually commended the peace deal framework and urges all parties to uphold their obligations and agreements. Tel Aviv voiced its desire for formal diplomatic relations with Damascus and Beirut back in June 2025. The political standing of Israel’s war in Gaza ties many of the obstacles preventing productive regional relations. Many government factions within Syria have openly expressed direct opposition to Israel’s campaign in Gaza and the secondary effects it has had on both Lebanon and Syria.
Analysis: The peace deal between Israel and Hamas, along with the end to hostilities, is likely to produce regional momentum in diplomacy, politics, and the economy. With the cessation of Israel’s military operations in Gaza, Tel Aviv will likely become more politically focused, primarily towards Lebanon and Syria. Both Damascus and Beirut have been seeking international support for post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization efforts. The removal of Gaza as a focal point of regional tension will likely make such diplomatic ventures more feasible and politically palatable for both sides. The absence of direct Israeli aggression could encourage multilateral discussions on border demarcation and diplomatic relations for Lebanon. Damascus will likely use the increase in political and regional discussions to attempt at a more acceptable deal regarding the Golan Heights. Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza and the end of hostilities are likely to shift the regional agenda from conflict management to recovery and development. This new environment could lead to greater cooperation, reduced tensions, and incremental normalization between Israel, Syria, and Lebanon.
[Unnamed Contributor]
Summary: The Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) declared a ceasefire following overnight clashes that resulted in at least one death. The ceasefire enables Damascus to consolidate control and pressure the SDF to integrate, using Turkish backing and international restraint to weaken SDF unity and heighten instability in northeastern Syria.
Development: On 7 October, the Syrian government and the SDF announced a ceasefire after overnight clashes killed at least one and injured others. Syrian Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra and SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi reached the agreement following direct talks, where they committed to a comprehensive halt to hostilities in northeastern Syria. The incident occurred against the backdrop of a stalled March 2025 agreement that aimed to integrate SDF members and territories into the new government. According to Syrian state media, the SDF attacked government positions in Hasakah, while the SDF denies initiating the violence and accuses Syrian forces of enforcing a siege and provoking violence. The ceasefire follows the 14 August Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Damascus and Ankara, in which Ankara agreed to provide military training, weapons, and logistical support to the new Syrian government. Ankara has justified its involvement by citing the SDF’s noncompliance with the March MoU. Turkish officials maintain that they reserve the right to intervene militarily if integration fails. Turkey continues to view the SDF as a threat to Syrian stability and unity.
Analysis: The ceasefire provides Damascus an opportunity to consolidate control and will likely use the appearance of restraint to avoid international scrutiny, especially as it moves to assert control over infrastructure in the northeast. The ceasefire is likely seen by the Syrian government as a measure to apply political pressure and reassert control without an immediate conflict. With Turkish backing, Damascus is likely less compelled to accommodate SDF demands for an independent unit within the Syrian military. Instead, it will continue to insist that the SDF integrate into the Syrian military as individuals. Military support and pressure from Ankara for the SDF to integrate will likely create timely pressure for the SDF to integrate, or it will likely face military action. Some units or individuals in the SDF may defect or agree to integration, weakening overall unity and likely leading to instability within northeastern Syria.
[Jacob Faciana]
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