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AIG Edition 14
- AIG Team
- Aug 1
- 4 min read
Summary: Syrian Foreign Minister Al-Shaibani met with his Russian counterpart in Moscow, seeking support for reconstruction amid rising regional tensions following an Israeli strike. Russia’s growing involvement will likely position Syria as a renewed geopolitical flash point and secure Moscow’s strategic influence in the eastern Mediterranean.
Development: On 31 July, the Syrian Foreign Minister Assad Al-Shaibani met with his Russian counterpart in Moscow for the first formal visit between the countries since the new government seized power in December 2024. Al-Shaibani stated he wants Moscow “by our side” when it comes to the reconstruction of Syria, according to Al Jazeera. Russia has a naval base in Tartus and an air base at Hmeimim, both of which are the only official Russian military bases outside of the former Soviet Union. Moscow was a key backer of the previous Assad regime before its removal in late 2024. Regional tensions escalated further on 16 July when Israel launched an airstrike on Syria’s Defense Ministry in Damascus, claiming it was in retaliation for alleged aggression against the Druze minority in the south. The strike drew condemnation from several Arab states and the United States. In response, Moscow reiterated its support for Syria and its post-conflict reconstruction.
Analysis: As Moscow strengthens ties with Syria’s new government, the country is likely to become a renewed geopolitical flash point at the intersection of competing regional and international interests. By signaling support for reconstruction and maintaining its military presence, Moscow is likely seeking continued strategic access to the eastern Mediterranean while reinforcing its status as a power broker in the region. The appeal from Damascus for Russian backing suggests the new government views Moscow as a critical partner amid rising regional instability, particularly following Israeli strikes and international scrutiny. The visit also indicates that Russia seeks to be a part of Syria’s post-conflict recovery, which could lead to Syria becoming a geopolitical flash point.
[Jacob Faciana]
Summary: Turkey will begin supplying Syria with Azerbaijani natural gas through a new pipeline starting 2 August, in a Qatar-backed deal aimed at restoring electricity across government-held areas. The agreement will likely reduce Iran and Russia’s influence in Syria and the wider region by positioning Turkey as a central player in the country’s reconstruction and energy sector, which could provoke regional tensions.
Development: On 30 July, Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar announced that Turkey will begin supplying Syria with natural gas on 2 August through a newly constructed pipeline originating in Kilis province and ending in Aleppo. The gas, sourced from Azerbaijan via Turkey under a swap agreement, will initially provide around 6 million cubic meters per day, enough to generate roughly 1,200 megawatts of electricity. The supply will be supplemented by an additional 500 megawatts of electricity directly provided by Turkey. The infrastructure and operations are backed by Qatari investment, marking a trilateral energy initiative between Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Qatar. This project is part of an agreement signed in May, under which Turkey pledged to deliver up to 2 billion cubic meters of gas annually to Syria. The electricity will be distributed primarily across government-held areas in northern and central Syria, including Aleppo, Hama, and Homs. The deal also includes Turkish technical support and potential future investment in Syria’s war-damaged energy grid. Previously, most of Syria’s power generation was reliant on erratic and costly fuel imports, often facilitated by Iran. The new arrangement could increase electricity availability from as little as three to four hours a day to more than 10 hours in key regions.
Analysis: Ankara’s new gas deal and commitment with Damascus will likely further diminish Iran and Russia’s regional influence, possibly provoking opposition. By transporting Azerbaijani gas to Syria, Ankara strengthens its role as a regional energy transit hub and diminishes Iran’s traditional influence over Syria’s energy sector. The agreement provides Turkey leverage in Syria’s economic and political reconstruction, while offering Qatar and Azerbaijan strategic partnership in the Levant. The inclusion of Azerbaijan into the deal will also strip Russia of more regional influence in the Caucuses. Domestically, Syria’s chronic power shortages are expected to ease substantially, likely enhancing public stability and governance legitimacy. This improvement may also deter reliance on Iran and Russia for fuel, reshaping Syria’s alliances. However, the deal carries risks: increased Turkish presence in infrastructure could provoke opposition from rival factions or regional actors wary of Ankara’s expanding influence.
[Unnamed Contributor]
Summary: South Korea proposed a multi-billion-dollar investment in U.S. shipyards to secure a trade deal with the Trump administration, aiming to mitigate tariffs. This investment is likely to increase ties with the U.S., while also diversifying trade with other countries to safeguard its economic and strategic position in the Indo-Pacific.
Development: On 28 July, South Korea pitched an investment in U.S. shipyards to the Trump administration, seeking to secure a trade deal to avoid U.S. tariffs, scheduled for 1 August. The tariffs target South Korea’s $120 billion in exports to the U.S., including semiconductors, automobiles, and electronics. The investment focuses on shipbuilding facilities, aiming to create jobs and support for U.S. naval infrastructure. The investment enhances U.S. naval capabilities, which are crucial for countering China’s influence in the South China Sea, where approximately 30% of global trade passes through. South Korea’s largest trading partner is China, which receives about 25% of its exports, including $40 billion in semiconductors annually. South Korea held a trade summit with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and India in Seoul on 25 July to explore new export markets. In 2017, the U.S. began deploying Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missiles to South Korea, which was met with opposition from China, which viewed it as a threat to their security.
Analysis: South Korea’s proposal is likely to make its role stronger in the U.S.’s Indo-Pacific presence, improving defense and economic ties as tensions grow with China and North Korea. Beijing is likely to retaliate against this agreement with trade barriers, as seen after the 2017 THAAD deployment, potentially disrupting supply chains. South Korea is likely to grow trade diversity through strengthening relations with ASEAN and India, to reduce reliance on China.
[Jacob Faciana]
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