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AIG Edition 12
- AIG Team
- Jul 18
- 5 min read
Summary: The UAE signed an $800 million agreement to develop Syria’s commercial port infrastructure, including facilities at Tartous, where Russia maintains its only naval presence in the Mediterranean. The deal is likely to constrain Russia’s military use of the port, prompting Moscow to expand and reinforce its presence at the Khmeimim Air Base to retain strategic access in the region.
Development: On 13 July, Syria’s General Authority for Land and Sea Ports signed an $800 million agreement with UAE-based DP World to modernize Syria’s maritime infrastructure and logistical networks. The deal includes development at the port of Tartous, where Russia operates its only naval port in the Mediterranean. The agreement focuses on enhancing civilian shipping and trade capacity, aligning with the growing economic involvement of Gulf Arab countries in Syria. Russia has maintained access to Tartous under a long-term lease signed with the Assad government in 2017, allowing it to operate the base for military and naval purposes. Russia also operates an air base, located 31 miles north of the Port of Tartus, known as Khmeimim Air Base. The Khmeimim Air Base is a strategic and important hub for Russia’s air operations in Africa, serving as its last notable military base in Syria.
Analysis: The expansion of commercial operations at Tartous is likely to dilute Russia’s ability to conduct unrestricted military and logistical activity at the port. To maintain its regional military presence, Moscow will likely respond by reinforcing the Khmeimim Air Base, its primary air and logistics hub in Syria. Enhancements may include upgrades to runway capacity, expansion of support facilities, and increased deployment of surveillance and air defense systems. As Russia loses exclusive operational control over Tartous, Khmeimim will become its most reliable platform for sustaining regional operations. The deal poses a threat to Russia’s global military posture that could force Russia to recalibrate its military footprint in Syria and rely more heavily on inland assets to maintain strategic depth in the Eastern Mediterranean.
[Jacob Faciana]
Summary: Ankara and Yerevan discussed the approval and implementation of the Zangezur Corridor, which would connect Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave through southern Armenia. The corridor would enable Azerbaijani energy exports to bypass Russian territory, significantly reducing Moscow's influence in regional transit. In response, Russia is likely to impose economic pressure on Armenia to delay the corridor's progress and deter Yerevan from moving further out of Moscow's geopolitical orbit.
Development: On 11 July, Turkish President Erdoğan met with Armenian Prime Minister Pašinyan to discuss the Zangezur Corridor being approved and establishing the route. Azerbaijan has an exclave, the Nakhchivan, which Armenia separates. The Zangezur Corridor would run alongside Armenia's southernmost border with Iran, connecting Azerbaijan to the Nakhchivan exclave. The establishment of the corridor will allow Azerbaijani energy exports to flow freely into Turkey and reach Mediterranean and European states while being able to cut out Russia from the equation. Throughout Azerbaijan and Armenia's decades-long war, the Zangezur Corridor has been one of the largest contention points. Moscow has long supported Yerevan in its war with Azerbaijan and used the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) as its umbrella for support and posture. The CSTO is a military alliance, which, up until 2024, included Armenia until Yerevan froze its funding and participation in the alliance. Yerevan froze its position in the CSTO because Russian shipments and support fell drastically after it invaded Ukraine in 2022. Alongside military support, Russia is Armenia's largest trading partner.
Analysis: Moscow is likely to increase its economic pressure on Yerevan with the goal of deterring it from establishing the Zangezur Corridor with Baku and Ankara. Russia's influence with the CSTO has diminished in Armenia since its suspension from the alliance in 2024, which will lead to Moscow's next immediate instrument of power: economic pressure. As Russia is Armenia's largest trade partner, it holds significant leverage over Yerevan through its decision-making. It will likely utilize this leverage to deter Yerevan from drifting more from its influential arm. Russia's already diminished role in the Caucasus since its invasion of Ukraine will likely become even further strained if the Zangezur Corridor comes into effect, being a major step in phasing out Moscow's role in the Caucasus. Ultimately, Moscow will likely create enough economic friction with Yerevan to delay the establishment of the Zangezur Corridor with hopes of reasserting its posture in the Caucasus. Yerevan's actions towards normalization and relations with Ankara and Baku are unlikely to go without a contest from Moscow.
[Unnamed Contributor]
Summary: Kurdish fighters from Turkey held a ceremony in northern Iraq to destroy their weapons as a sign of giving up their armed resistance against Turkey. The disarmament efforts are likely to reduce Turkish pressure on the Syrian Kurds and create space for renewed integration talks with Damascus, which could lead to a finalized integration plan by the end of 2025.
Development: On 11 July, members of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) conducted a ceremonial disarmament in northern Iraq, publicly destroying weapons as part of a broader demobilization effort. The disarmament follows months of pressure from Ankara, including cross-border operations and backchannel diplomacy involving the sentence reduction for the jailed PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, in exchange for a call for disarmament. Ankara has long considered the PKK and its Syrian offshoot, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), as existential security threats. Although the SDF operates independently of the PKK, Turkey frequently fuses the two. Ankara has welcomed the PKK's disarmament and stated that it promises to work towards stability and reconciliation. The move has triggered a regional reassessment of Kurdish armed movements, particularly in Syria, where the SDF continues to control large parts of the northeast. The SDF agreed to integrate into the Syrian government by the end of the year, but the parties have not agreed on a clear plan to complete this goal.
Analysis: The PKK's disarmament efforts and withdrawal from armed resistance will likely create a more open dialogue for the SDF and Damascus to discuss the integration process. Turkey is likely to interpret the PKK's disarmament as a reduction in the broader Kurdish militant threat, which may result in a more moderate stance against the SDF in northeast Syria. While Turkey remains wary of SDF control near its border, the symbolic weakening of the PKK could reduce Ankara's perceived need for direct military action. This shift in threat perception may open space for the SDF to pursue political dialogue with Damascus. The SDF is more likely to accelerate talks with the Syrian government on integration guarantees if regional Kurdish allies, such as the PKK, are guaranteed freedoms and if they seem optimistic with momentum and promise. Ankara wants post-war Syria to become a stable state for Turkish investments, which will likely drive Ankara to provide favorable results for the Kurds in Turkey, with the hopes that it will smooth the integration of the SDF.
[Unnamed Contributor]
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