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AIG Edition 18
- AIG Team
- Jan 17
- 6 min read
Summary: Armed Kurdish groups based in Iraq’s Kurdistan region have attempted to cross into Iran amid nationwide protests, raising the potential for increased regional stability. The crossings highlight the intersection of Kurdish militancy, Iran’s domestic unrest, and regional security dynamics, and may pressure Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to manage military activity within their borders.Â
Development: On 14 January, multiple armed Kurdish groups reportedly attempted to enter Iran from northern Iraq, exploiting Iran’s domestic unrest caused by nationwide protests. These groups, including the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), have historically operated from Iraq’s Kurdistan region, where they maintain political and military power. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) engaged the groups near the border, emphasizing Tehran’s concern about the security threat. Ankara warned Tehran about these movements, reflecting Ankara’s concern over Kurdish militancy in the region.Â
Analysis: The attempted Kurdish incursions into Iran are likely to intensify Iran’s internal security focus in its Kurdish regions, potentially diverting resources from controlling protests and other domestic issues. Kurdish activity across borders also pressures Iraq and the KRG to manage hostility within their territory, likely testing cooperation between the two. Ankara’s warnings to Tehran likely highlight the concern among neighboring states about Kurdish military movements and the potential for escalation. If Kurdish armed groups establish a sustained presence along Iran's border, it could not only ignite a new conflict but also significantly escalate existing political tensions within Iran, further destabilizing the region and potentially intensifying internal divisions.
[Jacob Faciana]
Summary: The United Nations says Sudan’s food supplies could run out by March without $700 million in funding, putting over 21 million people at risk of hunger. The ongoing civil war in Sudan has blocked supply routes and made aid delivery challenging. A humanitarian ceasefire would likely only be effective if tied to a recognized central government.
Development: On 16 January, the United Nations World Food Program (WFP) issued an urgent warning that its food supplies in Sudan could run out by the end of March unless an additional $700 million in funding is secured to maintain operations through June. The funding largely depends on international donors, including Western countries and Gulf states. More than 21 million people are facing hunger, and the WFP has already cut rations to around 50–60% of normal levels, just enough to prevent starvation. While humanitarian aid has reached some areas without a formal ceasefire, challenges such as blocked roads, unsafe supply routes, and conflict over key towns continue to make aid delivery extremely difficult. The civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which began in 2023, has killed tens of thousands and displaced millions. Major battles, including clashes in Khartoum and Darfur, have worsened the situation. Recent ceasefire talks mediated by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have failed to stop the fighting.Â
Analysis: A humanitarian ceasefire in Sudan could ease suffering for millions in the short term, but it also will likely strengthen divisions if it treats the SAF and RSF as separate authorities without a more general political structure. By dealing with both sides as equals, international efforts could unintentionally give legitimacy to both powers, weakening Sudan’s national unity. A ceasefire that freezes frontlines without clarifying who has authority or command could deepen administrative divisions. Humanitarian aid, when not tied to a larger political solution, can shift from saving lives to shaping how the conflict unfolds. Even if fighting pauses, funding gaps, blocked routes, or ongoing insecurity could prevent aid from reaching those who need it most. In the long term, the effectiveness of a ceasefire will likely depend on whether it is paired with a clear commitment to a single, recognized central government with authority over all territories. Without that, a ceasefire risks becoming an open-ended pause that reinforces divisions, while leaving millions exposed to hunger, displacement, and the long-term effects of malnutrition.
[Jacob Faciana]
Summary:Â The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) recently agreed to withdraw from northeastern Syria amid deadly clashes with the Syrian Army which displaced approximately 150,000 people. Just days prior, the U.S. launched strikes on Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) targets in Syria. The U.S. will likely increase its operational tempo and presence on the ground in northeastern Syria to prevent the reemergence of ISIS in Syria as the SDF starts to step away from its counterterrorism function.Â
Background:Â On 16 January, the SDF agreed to withdraw from key cities in northeastern Syria as deadly clashes with the Syrian Army came to a halt. The SDF, a Kurdish-led coalition backed by the U.S., has served as the primary local partner in counterterrorism operations against ISIS in northeastern Syria. The SDF has maintained control over key population centers, detention facilities holding ISIS fighters, and displacement camps housing individuals affiliated with ISIS. Recent clashes between SDF elements and the Syrian Army resulted in significant civilian displacement and deaths. Following these clashes, the SDF agreed to withdraw from certain areas of northeastern Syria. The withdrawal reduced SDF control over territory previously used to support internal security operations, border monitoring, and counter-insurgency patrols. U.S. forces maintain a limited military presence in northeastern Syria focused on counterterrorism missions against ISIS. In the days preceding the SDF withdrawal agreement, the U.S. conducted airstrikes targeting ISIS positions in Syria. Roughly one week prior to the SDF withdrawal, Washington brokered a deal with Damascus and Tel Aviv to create an intelligence-sharing cell between the two nations.Â
Analysis: The U.S. will likely assume a more direct counterterrorism role in northeastern Syria by increasing its operational tempo and presence as the SDF’s counter-ISIS capacity erodes. The SDF’s eroding influence and growing preoccupation with clashes against the Syrian Army are reducing its capacity to conduct sustained counter-ISIS operations, including patrols and detainee oversight. These constraints increase the risk that ISIS cells will exploit emerging security gaps, particularly in contested and rural areas where persistent pressure is required to prevent reorganization. To offset these vulnerabilities, the U.S. is likely to assume a more direct counterterrorism role by increasing strike activity, surveillance, and limited ground presence. This approach allows Washington to maintain pressure on ISIS while reducing dependence on an overstretched partner force, such as the SDF. At the same time, the U.S. is likely to avoid actions that could destabilize the current government in Damascus, particularly amid the emergence of a Syria-Israel intelligence-sharing mechanism that aligns with broader U.S. regional counterterrorism objectives. By independently increasing operational tempo rather than leveraging the SDF against Damascus, the U.S. can contain the ISIS threat while preserving emerging regional security dynamics and minimizing escalation with state actors in Syria.
[Unnamed Contributor]
Summary: The U.S. captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in a large-scale military operation in Caracas, ending China’s preferential access to Venezuelan oil and strategic minerals. Beijing is likely to expand trade, investment, and financing in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Peru to sustain its economic and geopolitical influence after losing access to Venezuela.
Background: On 3 January, the U.S. launched a multi-domain operation in Venezuela, ultimately capturing President Nicolás Maduro. Over the last couple of decades, Beijing has strengthened its ties and investments with Caracas to make it China’s largest partner in South America. Chinese companies and policy banks have provided billions in oil-backed loans to Venezuela, giving Beijing preferential access to crude and strategic minerals. Beyond Venezuela, China maintains significant economic ties in South America. In Brazil, China is the largest trading partner, with investments in commodities such as soy, iron ore, and oil, as well as ports and rail infrastructure. Beijing also engages the region through Belt and Road Initiative projects, trade agreements, and diplomatic forums.Â
Analysis: Beijing is likely to accelerate engagement across South America to sustain its geopolitical and economic footprint after its loss of influence in Venezuela. China is already the region’s largest trading partner, and its state banks and firms have facilitated substantial infrastructure, energy, and commodity deals in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru, and beyond, frequently under the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative. The region will likely see an aggressive increase in Chinese influence following the removal of President Maduro. In Brazil, China’s leadership as a trading partner and investor in commodities and transport infrastructure gives Beijing leverage with South America’s largest economy. Across the region, Chinese credit lines, development financing, and trade agreements deepen linkages and provide diplomatic influence that Beijing can reinforce now that access to Venezuela is constrained. This expanded engagement is likely to focus on economic integration and infrastructure investment, rather than military commitments, enabling China to maintain influence in a hemisphere traditionally dominated by the U.S. while managing geopolitical risks. Beijing’s push into regional markets allows it to diversify its partnerships, sustain demand for Chinese goods and capital, and mitigate the impact of setbacks in Venezuela by anchoring influence in larger, more stable South American economies.
[Unnamed Contributor]