AIG Edition 8
- Jake Faciana
- Jun 13
- 11 min read
Summary: Russia announced that it will increase its military and economic presence in Africa through its paramilitary group, Africa Corps, which is replacing the Wagner Group. Russia's expansion into Africa is likely to increase to circumvent Western sanctions imposed over the war in Ukraine, while also gaining access to new territories to extend its influence and maintain global power amid escalating tensions and sanctions with Europe and the U.S.
Development: On 9 June, Kremlin spokesperson Dimitry Peskov announced that Russia is expanding its African footprint. The move came as Western influence in the Sahel declined due to several military coups and the withdrawal of French forces. Russia's paramilitary group, Wagner, has recently withdrawn from Mali after three years of fighting for the Malian government on the ground. Shortly after, Russia replaced the Wagner group with the Africa Corps, mainly focused on backing pro-Russian governments and advancing Moscow's political interests in Africa. Sources estimate that 80% of the Africa Corps is former Wagner members, according to Al Jazeera. Since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, it has faced sanctions from the West. The sanctions aim to isolate Moscow economically and weaken its military capabilities. In response, Russia has turned to other partners and has looked to alternative trade routes to bypass restrictions and keep up with its global influence. Recently, Russia's war with Ukraine has seen an increase in operational tempo following Ukraine's drone strikes deep inside Russian territory. In response, Russia has increased strikes in Ukraine, launching 499 aerial weapons.
Analysis: Russia’s recent expansion of its Africa Corps in the Sahel likely represents Moscow’s strategy to build up its presence in Africa to bypass sanctions and access alternative trade routes into the Atlantic Ocean. With the recent escalation in its war with Ukraine, sanctions from Western nations will likely persist and increase, forcing Russia to divert influence efforts in Africa to circumvent its loss of access to Europe. Russia will likely use the void of external influence in the Sahel to expand its influence outside of Europe to circumvent its loss of influence in Europe from its war in Ukraine. Europe will likely increase and persist in its sanctions against Russia due to the increased hostilities in the war in Ukraine, which will lead Russia to seek alternative territory to project its power and influence to maintain global competitiveness.
[Jacob Faciana]
Summary: Damascus has issued a new directive mandating that all women on public beaches wear conservative swimwear that fully covers the body. The new conservative directive is likely intended to appease extremist factions that have been incorporated into Syria’s transitional government, whose hardline ideologies continue to pose a challenge to the new administration.
Development: On 9 June, Syria’s government issued a decree stating that conservative swimwear should be worn on all public beaches and pools, specifying that women need “a swimsuit that covers the body except for the face, hands, and feet,” according to the BBC. The decree also stated that men must not be bare-chested outside the water. In May 2025, Damascus ordered all other rebel factions to integrate with the new Syrian government. The ideologies of the various rebel groups integrated into the new Syrian government vary significantly, with some espousing more extreme views than others. Among these factions are Jaysh al-Islam and the Turkistan Islamic Party, which were incorporated into the Syrian transitional government. These groups have been outspoken in their adherence to Salafi Jihadism, a hardline interpretation of Islam that has shaped their political and military agendas.
Analysis: The recent directive mandating conservative swimwear for women on public beaches and in pools may indicate a new trend aimed at appeasing the recent extremist factions in the government with conservative laws. The integration of extremist groups into the government, such as Jaysh al-Islam and the Turkistan Islamic Party, likely has caused ideological tensions within the government due to the transitional government working towards a moderate and inclusive government. The transitional government in Syria is likely to implement more conservative laws to appease and decrease tensions with the extremist factions within the government. The new Syrian government will likely face significant challenges in managing the conflicting pressures from hardline factions within its ranks and from Western countries. While extremist groups demand stricter ideological policies, Western nations have made it clear that economic investment and support will depend on the government's commitment to moderation and inclusivity.
[Jacob Faciana]
Summary: Syrian authorities closed and emptied the Rukban refugee camp near the Jordanian border. The thousands of refugees reentering Syrian society will likely set a precedent and be viewed under observation, shaping how future refugee returns from neighboring countries will reintegrate.
Development: On 7 June, Syrian authorities closed down the Rukban refugee camp near the Jordanian border, sending the refugees back to their homes throughout Syria. The Rukban refugee camp, at the time of its closure, held around 11,000 people, who are now starting to reintegrate into Syria under the new government. The Rukban camp has served as a staging ground for several Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) attacks on Jordanian military positions across the border throughout its tenure. The youth in the Rukban camps and many alike either lack quality education or have none at all. The main hurdle facing Syrian returnees from both abroad and especially the Rukban camp is “the lack of economic opportunities and essential services,” according to the International Organization for Migration.
Analysis: The thousands of refugees from the Rukban camp reintegrating into Syria will likely be followed by close observation, helping to inform future reintegration efforts and address existing obstacles in the process. The presence of ISIS ideology in the Rukban camp, along with nonexistent education, will likely pose a threat due to the potential spread of extremist beliefs that go against the new government in Damascus. The reintegrating refugees from the Rukban camp will likely need financial assistance from the state or municipalities to stay afloat in society, especially since economic opportunities are absent. The lack of education throughout the camps, especially amongst the youth, will present a significant challenge that requires close attention when supporting refugees' reintegration into the workforce. The reintegration process will likely act as a pilot phase, addressing obstacles for a more effective process when refugees from neighboring countries potentially return in much larger numbers.
[Unnamed Contributor]
Summary: The Israeli military carried out airstrikes on Beirut’s southern suburbs, targeting structures believed to be a part of Hezbollah’s drone manufacturing operation. The U.S. is likely to enter into the mediation and negotiate a halt to Israeli strikes in Lebanon due to consistent signs of and a plan to achieve disarmament of Hezbollah.
Development: On 6 June, Israel carried out attacks on the southern suburbs of Beirut, targeting structures believed to be a part of Hezbollah’s drone manufacturing operation. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) came out and stated that if Israeli strikes continued, they would freeze their cooperation with the ceasefire committee “when it comes to searching posts,” according to AP News. The LAF has dismantled over 500 military sites south of the Litani River, a region long seen as one of Hezbollah’s key strongholds. Tel Aviv warned Beirut that it will keep striking Hezbollah targets until the group disarms. On 8 June, Beirut proposed an idea that Washington should carry out negotiations with Tel Aviv to halt Israeli strikes in Lebanon.
Analysis: The U.S. is likely to enter into mediation between Israel and Lebanon to halt Israeli strikes into Lebanese territory as the Lebanese government continues to demonstrate progress in addressing the issue of Hezbollah's armed presence. The LAF continues to pursue security south of the Litani River and recently announced the dismantling of 500 Hezbollah military installations, showing steady momentum toward disarming Hezbollah. The LAF and decision-makers involved in Hezbollah's disarmament are likely to continue the initiative slowly and gradually to avoid mass internal conflict or possibly a civil war. Since the inauguration of President Joseph Aoun in January 2025, Lebanon's new political leadership has been viewed favorably by the U.S., particularly for its alignment on policies concerning Hezbollah and efforts to promote regional stability independent of Iran. If Israeli strikes across Lebanon continue and the LAF suspends cooperation with the ceasefire committee, the steady progress toward peacefully disarming Hezbollah could collapse. An increase in strikes and a reversal in Hezbollah disarmament may push Lebanon back into conflict and drive away the foreign investment essential for its reconstruction.
[Unnamed Contributor]
Summary: Many African countries, such as Ghana, have shifted their support to Morocco in the decades-long conflict in the Western Sahara between the Sahrawi Polisario Front and Morocco. The Polisario Front will likely increase hostilities against Morocco in the Western Sahara to regain relevance and support from the international community.
Development: On 6 June, Accra ended its support for the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic to recognize Morocco’s autonomy plan over the Western Sahara. The Sahrawi ethnic group is indigenous and claims authority over the Western Sahara. Morocco has been excluded and denied entry into multiple African alliances due to its claim of authority over the Western Sahara. Nigeria established a gas pipeline deal with Morocco, which is set to start in 2025 and connects 16 West African countries. The Sahel states, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, recently established a deal with Rabat back in April 2025 to be given Atlantic port access in the Western Sahara under Moroccan control. In May 2025, Damascus announced the closure of premises in Syria belonging to the Polisario Front. A Moroccan delegation visited Damascus to discuss reopening its embassy in Syria, with Damascus affirming its support for Morocco’s sovereignty and rejecting support for the Polisario Front.
Analysis: The Western Sahara is likely to see a rise in hostilities from the Polisario Front due to its lack of relevance and support from the international community. Algeria will likely increase its support for the Polisario Front as international backing for the group declines. Countries critical of Morocco are shifting toward diplomatic and economic ties with Rabat, weakening the Polisario's external support. The continued increase of geopolitical pivots supporting Moroccan authority over the Western Sahara will likely isolate the Polisario Front further. The Polisario Front, along with its leading supporter, Algeria, will likely resort to hostile tactics in the Western Sahara in an attempt to regain international relevance and leverage. The Western Sahara could see an increase in counterterrorism efforts from Moroccan partners, such as the U.S. and Europe, to ensure its autonomy in the Western Sahara and further its stability for economic and security objectives.
[Unnamed Contributor]
Summary: Caracas is filling the void left by departing U.S. oil companies by partnering with Chinese firms to leverage Venezuela’s status as the world’s largest crude oil reserves holder. China will likely expand its infrastructure within Venezuela’s oil-rich reserves to establish more control over the global oil market against the U.S.
Development: On 6 June, Caracas partnered with Chinese firms to enter its oil industry, just a month after the U.S. forced oil firms to cease oil operations in Venezuela. The U.S. oil firms accounted for 52% of all of Venezuela’s exports before Washington forced the withdrawal of U.S. oil firms from Venezuela after the U.S.-issued licenses permitting them to export Venezuelan oil expired. U.S. President Donald Trump imposed 25% secondary tariffs on any country purchasing Venezuelan oil, while Venezuela holds the world’s largest crude oil reserves. Venezuela has been rebranding its crude oil as Brazilian crude oil to work around U.S. secondary sanctions, rebranding over $1 billion worth.
Analysis: China is likely to expand and create better oil production infrastructure throughout Venezuela due to the U.S. completing all oil export operations in Venezuela. The concealed efforts taken by Venezuela and China to disguise and rebrand crude oil out of Brazil will likely prompt tighter measures and increased countermeasures from the U.S. The rise in gas prices in Venezuela to 50% due to the withdrawal of U.S. oil companies will likely drive Caracas to implement Chinese investment rapidly. With U.S. oil service providers fully withdrawn, China will likely expand its operations in Venezuela’s vast crude reserves, bolstering oil production and President Nicolás Maduro’s political apparatus for future investments that rely on Maduro retaining power. The redirection of Venezuelan oil into global markets is likely to challenge the U.S., which could lead to more secondary tariffs on Venezuelan oil imports and increased countermeasures on rebranding Venezuelan crude oil out of Brazil. President Maduro’s power in Venezuela is likely to become bolstered with more Chinese involvement and support entering Venezuela.
[Unnamed Contributor]
Summary: Israel has confirmed its involvement in arming a Palestinian militia in Gaza as a new strategy to fight and weaken Hamas. Israel will likely keep its support limited and the weapons it supplies outdated to make sure the militia does not turn into a formidable threat against Israel in the future.
Development: On 5 June, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu openly confirmed his administration is supplying arms to the Popular Forces (PF), a militia in Gaza, as part of a plan to destabilize Hamas. The PF, led by Yasser Abu Shabab, claims to be managing the distribution of humanitarian aid in Gaza. However, the PF has previously faced claims of taking over aid convoys entering Gaza. Abu Shabab has denied any direct cooperation with Israel, which appeared after he received criticism from Palestinian leaders, who consider him a traitor. Former Israeli Defense Minister and opposition lawmaker Avigdor Liberman is warning that arming militias like the PF will lead to unintended results and create more significant instability in Gaza. In response to Avigdor Liberman, Netanyahu admitted that Israel is supporting the PF, justifying it by saying, “On the advice of security officials, we mobilized clans in Gaza that are against Hamas…it’s beneficial. It saves the lives of IDF soldiers.”
Analysis: Israel will likely keep the support for the PF limited and outdated to keep control over the group, making sure they do not become a formidable force in the future against Israel. Netanyahu’s decision to arm the PF likely indicates that limited alternatives remain in the ongoing war in Gaza. Using militias inside Gaza will likely directly reduce IDF casualties while causing friction in Gaza by dividing groups between Hamas and the PF. Although the PF’s ties to Israel have already attracted criticism and accusations of betrayal, the power struggle within Gaza is likely to fuel internal divisions and conflict, diverting attention from Israeli operations. Abu Shabab’s denial of working with the Israeli government likely implies a desire to keep some legitimacy with Palestinians while utilizing Israeli support to wield against Hamas in order to gain power. If the PF were to seize a sizable amount of power from Hamas, it would likely continue in its original efforts to resist Israel.
[Jacob Faciana]
Summary: Under the previous U.S. administration, Kyiv agreed with Washington to receive 20,000 air defense systems in its war with Russia. Vlodomyr Zelenskyy has announced that the new U.S. administration is rerouting those air defense systems to its Air Force bases in the Middle East. If the U.S. and Iran establish a nuclear deal and the war against Russia remains intense, the U.S. will likely return the air defense missiles to Ukraine.
Development: On 5 June, the U.S. moved 20,000 air defense missiles, bound for Ukraine, to U.S. Air Force units in the Middle East. The air defense missiles include special fuses for ground-based rockets, which are crucial for intercepting Russia’s Iranian-made Shahed rockets and drones. On 8 June, Russia launched 499 aerial weapons, which involved drones and rockets, in what the Ukrainian Air Force described as a “record-breaking” Russian aerial assault. Iranian Shahed drones, which are an essential part of Russia’s offensive, are now being mass-produced inside Russia. Ukraine’s air defenses have been overwhelmed recently due to Moscow’s increase in drone strikes. In response, Ukraine is relocating air defense systems across the country to protect against Russian attacks. The U.S. and Iran are approaching the sixty-day deadline of 11 June for their nuclear negotiations, and U.S. President Donald Trump has previously stated he will use “military force” against Iran if they do not reach a deal before the deadline.
Analysis: As the U.S. redirects its air defense systems originally intended for Ukraine, Kyiv will likely escalate its operational tempo to strengthen its appeal for U.S. support, specifically for additional air defense systems. Ukraine’s strategic movement of its existing air defense systems across the country likely represents a shortage, emphasizing a reliance on these systems. Russia’s recent increase in overnight aerial attacks is likely a response to the redirection of air defense missiles, presumably seizing the opportunity to exploit Ukraine’s reduced defense capabilities. The U.S. likely redirected air defense missiles to Air Force units in the Middle East to prevent any possible attack from Iran, following Trump’s threat of military action if Tehran does not accept an agreement. If Washington establishes a nuclear deal with Tehran and the war’s pace in Ukraine remains high, it will likely transfer the aerial defense missiles back to Ukraine.
[Jacob Faciana]
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